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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Previous litigation between appellant, Allied Erecting and 
Dismantling, Co., Inc., and appellee, USX Corporation, was 
settled on the eve of trial. In this suit, Allied claims that 
USX violated several provisions of that settlement 
agreement. The District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of USX, and Allied appeals. Many facts ar e 
contested, but we have isolated those that ar e germane to 
the three issues reaching us on appeal. As fully explained 
below, we will reverse the District Court's judgment in two 





On the eve of trial for the first action br ought by Allied 
against USX Corporation, the two entities enter ed into a 
court-supervised Settlement Agreement. Allied claimed that 
it suffered sixty-six million dollars in damages as a result 
of contracts it entered into with USX to dismantle several of 
USX's steelmaking facilities. The Settlement Agr eement, 
which is at the heart of this controversy, pr ovided: 1) USX 
would pay Allied eight million dollars; 2) Allied would be 
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granted all dismantling projects at USX's Fairless Works 
plant; 3) Allied could bid in good faith as a primary bidder 
on USX's subsequent dismantling projects; 4) Allied would 
be granted "last look" rights for a period of seven years to 
equal or better the most acceptable bid received by USX for 
any dismantling projects; 5) Allied would be awarded 
dismantling contracts at USX's Ambridge Works, Saxonburg 
Works, and McDonald Works. 
 
1. Allied's Section V Claim 
 
Allied's first two claims arise from Section V of the 
Settlement Agreement, which reads: 
 
       Except as to any dismantling work at USX's South 
       Works facility in Chicago, Illinois, Allied shall be invited 
       to bid in good faith as one of U.S. Steel Gr oups' 
       primary bidders on any dismantling work, of whatever 
       nature or type at any steelmaking facilities, or former 
       steelmaking facilities, owned by the U.S. Steel Gr oup 
       consistent with and pursuant to specification and 
       performance standards developed and issued by U.S. 
       Steel Group for such work and, for a period of seven (7) 
       years from the date of this Settlement Agr eement and 
       General Release, Allied shall be offer ed an opportunity 
       to equal and/or to better the most acceptable bid 
       received by the U.S. Steel Group for any such further 
       dismantling activity. If, within ten (10) days of r eceipt 
       of bids, Allied offers in writing to per form such work on 
       such terms which are equal to or better than the bid 
       otherwise most acceptable to the U.S. Steel Gr oup, 
       then, in such event, the work shall be awarded to 
       Allied, provided, however, that Allied is then able to 
       meet U.S. Steel Group performance standards then in 
       effect and, further, that Allied has not been adjudicated 
       to be in default under any dismantling contract with 
       U.S. Steel Group then in effect at the time of such 
       bidding. 
 
Under this "last look" provision, USX issued Allied and 
other dismantlers specifications for projects up for bid. The 
third parties then bid on the projects subject to the 
condition that "Purchaser [USX] r eserves the right to reject 
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any or all bids." No third party was told that Allied held the 
right to review and match their final bids. For the first few 
sessions, Allied formulated and submitted ear nest bids on 
the projects. Formulating a bid for pr ojects such as these 
can be cost and labor intensive, and Allied later determined 
that instead of participating in the bidding pr ocess it would 
merely review the best bid offer ed to USX and decide if it 
wanted to take the job at that price. 
 
Allied claims that USX violated the terms of Section V 
through its relationship with Allied's ar ch-rival, 
Brandenburg Industrial Services Company, Inc. Because 
the litigation soured Allied and USX's working relationship, 
USX awarded most of its dismantling projects thereafter to 
Brandenburg. As a result of this close working relationship, 
Brandenburg prepared most of the specifications for the 
projects on which Allied held the "last look" right. Because 
Brandenburg prepared these specifications, Allied argued, it 
held an "unquestioned and substantial advantage over the 
other bidders for this work." Within one bid, Brandenburg 
offered to forgive $379,500 that USX owed for developing 
the project specifications if USX granted the project to 
Brandenburg. Allied was unable to compete with an offer 
that included debt forgiveness, and ther efore claims that 
such dealings between USX and Brandenburg materially 
varied the terms of the project specifications and violated 
Allied's last look rights. 
 
2. Allied's Fraudulent Inducement Claim 
 
Allied next claims that it was fraudulently induced into 
accepting Section V of the Settlement Agreement. Allied 
claims that USX stated during the settlement bar gaining 
process that USX would be preparing the specifications for 
the projects on which Allied would bid pursuant to Section 
V. This statement led Allied to believe that its last look 
rights would not be undercut by a competitor who prepared 
the specifications and could therefor e offer a discount by 
including the price of the preparations in the bid. At the 
time USX allegedly made these statements to Allied, USX 
had already retained Brandenburg to prepare specifications 
for two of the projects on which Allied intended to bid. 
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Brandenburg subsequently used this leverage to outbid 
Allied on one of the projects. 
 
3. Allied's Saxonburg Claim 
 
Allied expected to quickly raze the Saxonbur g Works 
plant, liquidate its materials for a substantial pr ofit, and 
thereby recoup some of its losses associated with the 
litigation. Section IV of the Settlement Agr eement reads, in 
part: 
 
       1) That all dismantling by Allied shall be per formed at 
       no cost to USX; 
 
       2) That the dismantling specification will not include 
       the provision for . . . any environmental remediation 
       (including any remediation and/or removal of asbestos) 
       by Allied, it being understood and agreed that any . . . 
       environmental remediation shall be for USX's account; 
 
       3) All ferrous and non-ferrous scrap pr oduced at the 
       dismantling projects shall belong to Allied. 
 
The project, however, became complicated by a steel 
manufacturing byproduct known as "sinter dust." 
According to Allied, 
 
       work in and around the dust was far mor e difficult 
       than anticipated because . . . [the sinter dust] impacted 
       the way facilities were dropped, the dust had to be 
       cleaned from the scrap generated during the 
       dismantling before the scrap could be dismantled and 
       processed, and, when the dust was dry it became 
       airborne and impacted visibility, [and] while it was wet, 
       it congealed into a soupy mush that significantly 
       slowed the work. 
 
In addition to the general difficulties Allied experienced in 
dismantling a plant full of beams, girders, and equipment 
caked with the dust, Allied discovered that some of the dust 
contained lead and therefore posed health risks to its 
employees working amidst more than 16,000 tons of the 
material. Allied notified USX of the hazar d and reminded 
USX of the relevant terms governing the Saxonburg work: 
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       If during the course of the demolition project an 
       environmental condition is discovered that requires 
       remediation, other than asbestos, the contractor shall 
       notify the purchaser and the purchaser shall be 
       responsible for any necessary remediation. The 
       contractor shall not be entitled to any additional 
       compensation resulting from any delays due to the 
       remediation process. 
 
To protect its workers, Allied outfitted them with 
protective clothing, respirators, and decontamination 
showers. The cost of these safety measures diminished 
Allied's anticipated profit, and the cumbersome gear 
rendered the workers less productive. USX instructed Allied 
to remove the lead infected dust surrounding the sinter 
machines, and Allied loaded and hauled the dust to an off- 
site hazardous dump. USX paid Allied for this service. 
Allied also offered to load and haul the remaining sinter 
dust for $4 per ton. USX agreed to the price and ultimately 
paid Allied to move 16,438 tons of the non-leaded dust to 
a dump site. 
 
Allied, however, claims that it perfor med remedial work 
beyond and distinct from "loading and hauling." Allied 
contends that Section IV of the Settlement Agr eement 
protected it from having to perfor m environmental 
remediation, and thus seeks to recover"the additional 
unanticipated costs it incurred in remediating the 
Saxonburg facility of this sinter dust in the form of delay 




A. The Enforceability of Section V 
 
The District Court "declared [Section V] a nullity and 
unenforceable as against public policy as practiced to date." 
Allied contends that Section V does not offend the common 
law consensus and therefore cannot be voided as against 
public policy. We agree. 
 
"It has long been settled," the District Court stated, "that 
a court will not become an aid in the enforcement of 
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contractual provisions where to do so would violate public 
policy." The Court recited 19th and early 20th century 
caselaw, beginning with Veazy v. Allen , 66 N.E. 103, 173 
N.Y. 359 (1903): 
 
       There are . . . phases of public policy which are as 
       enduring and immutable as the law of gravity. One of 
       them is that, as applied to the law of contracts, courts 
       of justice will never recognize or uphold any 
       transaction which in its object, operation, or tendency 
       is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare. 
       That sound morality and civic honesty are 
       cornerstones of the social edifice is a truism which 
       needs no reinforcement by argument. It may therefore 
       be taken for granted that whenever our courts ar e 
       called upon to scrutinize a contract which is clearly 
       repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty, they 
       need not look for a well fitting definition of public 
       policy, nor hesitate in its practical application in the 
       law on contracts. 
 
"The rule is," the Court continued as it cited the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kuhn v. Buhl , 96 A. 977, 
984 (1916), "that courts having in their view public 
interests, will not lend their aid to the enfor cement of an 
unlawful contract." The Court drew its dir ect authority from 
Pittsburgh Dredging and Constr. Co. v. Monongahela and 
Western Dredging Co., 139 F . 780, 784 (Circuit Court, 
W.D.Pa. 1905), which stated that "[v]iewed from that 
standpoint of morals, square dealing, and commercial 
integrity, combinations for collusive, misleading, biddings, 
wherever made, cannot be approved; yet to enforce rights 
based on an agreement to make such bids is to make the 
law an active agent to accomplish such deceptive 
purposes." 
 
       Regarding Section V of the settlement Agr eement, the 
       Court found that the evil tendency of the contract was 
       or would be to perpetrate a fraud on the thir d-party 
       bidders and to deny one bidder on each project the 
       natural consequence of the bidder's endeavors . . . This 
       potential fraud has been and would continue to be 
       perpetrated on innocent third parties by using the 
       court and the confidentiality of the settlement 
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       agreement to keep this practice undisclosed as to both 
       the victims and the public. The injury to competition 
       may not be immediate in any particular project, but if 
       this arrangement were to be carried into ef fect 
       repetitively, over the seven-year period, it is clear that 
       it would have an injurious effect on competition by 
       denying certain of those third parties what should 
       otherwise have been awarded to them for their honest 
       work and labor in formulating the bids. 
 
Stating that Section V "contains the tendency to work fraud 
on the innocent third party bidders, repugnantly distorts 
the natural consequences of bona fide competition, and 
uses the court to shelter this state of affairs from 
detection," the Court held that the "pr ovision is, indeed, 
void as against public policy." Further, the Court refused to 
shift the blame for the illegality of Section V to USX 
because Allied could have genuinely participated in the 
bidding process and demanded that USX disclose Allied's 
last look right to the other bidders. The Court was unwilling 
to find that Allied was victimized by this pr ovision because 
it concluded that Allied chose not to participate in the 
bidding process on several of the projects, unfairly 
benefitted from having others shoulder the expense of 
drafting the specifications, and unscrupulously viewed the 
bids of its rivals without their consent. The Court also 
refused to allow its supervisory approval of the Settlement 
Agreement to validate Section V, concluding that it was 
Allied's failure to genuinely participate in the bidding and 
inform other bidders of its last look rights that rendered it 
infirm. 
 
When ruling on the grounds of pubic policy, a court must 
speak for a "virtual unanimity" that can "be found in 
definite indications in the law." Muschany v. United States, 
324 U.S. 49, 451 (1945); Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 17 
A.2d 407 (1941). We cannot find such a consensus. To the 
contrary, the state of the law on this issue is entirely 
unclear, as "last look" and "first r efusal" rights are typically 
found unproblematic in a variety of contexts. See Crivelli v. 
General Motors Corp., 215 F.3d 386 (3r d Cir. 2000) 
(permitting right of first refusal for automobile franchisor); 
Transmission Access Policy Group v. Federal Energy 
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Regulatory Comm'n, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir . 2000) 
(permitting right of first refusal for utilities costumers); 
Handelsman v. Bedford Village Assocs., 213 F.3d 48 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (permitting right of first refusal granted to real 
estate partnership pursuant to settlement agr eement); 
Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 
F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660 
(10th Cir. 1997) (finding the failur e to disclose last look in 
securities bidding not fraudulent); Castle Rock Cellular of 
Oregon v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (finding implied covenant of good faith violated 
by agreement to purchase shell company in attempt to 
avoid first refusal provisions of partnership agreement); 
Pincus v. Pabst Brewing Co., 893 F .2d 1544 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Schultze v. Chevron Oil Co., 579 F .2d 776 (3d Cir. 1978); 
CBS, Inc. v. Capital Cities Comm., 301 Pa. Super . 557, 448 
A.2d 48 (1982); Sun Oil Co. of Pa. v. Bellone , 292 Pa. Super. 
341, 437 A.2d 415 (1981). Considering the wide acceptance 
of last look rights, the District Court's policy analysis 
contradicts common law consensus and is ther efore 
unsupportable. In addition, Section V was an element of 
the court-supervised agreement to settle the pr evious 
litigation. The principles of this agreement were met with 
approval by the trial judge presiding over that litigation, 
and this authorization further militates against the 
argument that there exist a virtual anonymity against last- 
look rights. 
 
The District Court's reliance on Pittsbur gh Dredging was 
misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff and defendant both 
were bidders on a dredging project let by a non-party. See 
Pittsburgh Dredging, 139 F. at 780. The two bidders agreed 
to submit bids within a few cents of one another and to 
split the work regardless of which bidder received the 
contract. See id. at 781. The company letting the project, 
which was not informed of this arrangement, r ejected both 
bids. One bidder then submitted a new bid and r eceived the 
dredging project, but did not shar e the work. See id. The 
other bidder sued to enforce the sharing agr eement, but the 
District Court found it void as against public policy, holding 
that "combinations for collusive, misleading biddings, 
wherever made, cannot be approved." Id. at 784. 
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Pittsburgh Dredging is distinguishable from the instant 
case, which involves not an agreement between two bidders 
without notice to the company letting the pr oject, but 
rather an agreement between the party letting the project 
and one bidder. There was no collusive or misleading 
bidding. The bidding process remained competitive in that 
every bidder made its best bid and USX expressly reserved 
to itself the unfettered right and discr etion to select the 
"most acceptable" bid from the most acceptable bidder and 
to reject any and all bids for any reason. Although Allied 
did perhaps have some advantage by being able to match 
the best bid, it by no means was guaranteed the pr oject 
over other bidders. Unlike the agreement in Pittsburgh 
Dredging, Section V does not involve collusive price fixing 
by bidders and therefore does not pr ovide a basis for 
rejection as against public policy. 
 
The District Court loosely referred to antitrust principles 
in its opinion, and Allied argues on appeal that because 
Section V constitutes neither a per se nor a rule of reason 
violation of the Sherman Act, it cannot violate public policy. 
Allied relies primarily on Sitkin Smelting & Refining Co. v. 
FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
Because we have already held that, irrespective of the 
Sherman Act, Section V does not violate general principles 
of public policy, we need not discuss Allied's Sher man Act 
argument. We note in passing, however , that we do not 
believe that Section V violates the Sherman Act. We ruled 
in Sitkin, a case involving a similar last look right exercised 
by a dismantling company, that the parties "desir ed to find 
the market price rather than influence the market price," 
and that, therefore, the contract did not violate the 
Sherman Act. Sitkin, 575 F.2d at 447. We believe that Allied 
and USX had similar intentions in drafting Section V , and, 
therefore, we are confident that there has been no Sherman 
Act violation. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the District Court err ed by 
finding Section V unenforceable as contrary to public 
policy. We will remand for the District Court to determine 
if USX must pay damages to Allied for breach of contractual 
obligations under Section V. 
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B. Fraudulent Inducement 
 
The fraudulent inducement claim contains thr ee sub- 
issues. First, does Nocito v. Lanuitti, 402 Pa. 288, 167 A.2d 
262 (1961), provide the controlling standard or was Nocito 
subsequently modified by Tilghman v. Dollenberg, 418 Pa. 
604, 213 A.2d 324 (1965)? Second, if Nocito requires 
parties to return consideration in or der to bring their 
fraudulent inducement claim, then is Allied entitled to an 
exception to this rule akin to that affor ded in Greenan v. 
Ernst, 393 Pa. 321, 143 A.2d 32 (1957)? Third, is Allied's 
fraudulent inducement claim barred because the 
statements made by USX prior to formalizing the 
Settlement Agreement pertain to future pr omises and thus 
are not actionable under a theory of fraudulent 
inducement? 
 
Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in 
Nocito, the District Court held that to maintain an action 
for fraud based on the Settlement Agreement, Allied "must 
either elect to `disaffirm the contract and offer to return . . . 
the consideration for [the] release or to affirm the voidable 
contract and waive the fraud.' " Nocito , 402 Pa. at 289. 
Allied did not return the consideration. The District Court 
therefore considered Allied's failur e to tender all 
consideration it received under the Settlement Agreement 
an affirmation of the contract and a waiver of its fraudulent 
inducement claim. We agree. 
 
Allied argues, however, that the rule set out in Nocito was 
sharpened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court four years 
later in Tilghman v. Dollenberg. Regarding the allegedly 
fraudulent sale of stocks, Tilghman stated: 
 
       A party who has been induced by fraud to pur chase 
       stock may, if he does so promptly, rescind the contract 
       and sue for the entire purchase price of the stock. 
       Where, however, [as] is in the instant case, the plaintiff 
       does not rescind the contract but elects to stand on it, 
       he may not recover the entire purchase price, but only 
       the difference between the real value of the property 
       purchased at the time of the sale and what was paid 
       for it . . . The affirmance of a contract induced by fraud 
       of the seller does not extinguish the right of the 
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       purchaser, and is not a waiver of the fraud, nor does it 
       bar the right of the purchaser to recover damages for 
       the fraud. 
 
418 Pa. at 610, 213 A.2d at 326-27. According to this more 
recent ruling by Pennsylvania's highest court, Allied argues 
that affirmation of a contract only bars a party from 
rescinding the contract and does not pr eclude it from 
pursuing its allegation of fraud. Although this 
interpretation appears to be at odds with Nocito, Allied 
claims it merely clarifies the rule by distinguishing 
attempts to rescind fraudulent contracts fr om attempts to 
enforce them. Allied argues that because it does not seek to 
rescind the Settlement Agreement, it has not waived its 
fraudulent inducement claim by failing to retur n the 
consideration it received. We ar e not convinced. 
 
As Tilghman indicates, a party can affirm a contract over 
a period of time without waiving a claim to fraudulent 
inducement. The affirmance will, however , bar rescission of 
the contract. See Emery v. Third Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, 
314 Pa. 544, 548, 171 A. 881, 883 (1934) ("An affirmance 
of the contract by the vendee, with such knowledge, merely 
extinguishes his right to rescind the sale. His other 
remedies remain unimpaired. The vendor can never 
complain that the vendee has not rescinded."); Miller v. 
Central Trust & Savings Co., 285 Pa. 472, 486, 132 A. 579, 
585 (1926) ("Affirmance of the contract is not a waiver of 
the fraud; nor does it bar the right to recover; it does bar 
a subsequent rescission."). 
 
Not rescinding a contract and failing to r eturn 
consideration are distinct legal matters fr om the affirmance 
issue addressed in Tilghman, and, as Nocito indicates, 
failing to return consideration does waive the right to 
pursue a fraudulent inducement claim. Thus, a party can 
affirm a contract and perform according to its terms for a 
period of time, but once fraudulent inducement is alleged 
the party must either return consideration or abandon the 
claim. See Dempsey v. Associated Aviation Underwriters, 
141 F.R.D. 248 (E.D.Pa. 1992), af f 'd, 977 F.2d 567 (3d 
Cir.1992); Hess v. Evans, 288 Pa. Super. 180, 181, 431 
A.2d 347, 348 (1981) (stating that "plaintif fs cannot 
proceed in this matter by alleging that the r elease was 
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obtained as the result of fraud and misr epresentation and 
at the same time retain the consideration that was paid to 
them"). Allied attempts to conflate the per mission Tilghman 
grants to parties to pursue fraudulent inducement claims 
even if they have at some point affirmed the contract with 
the distinct proposition that a party needs only to return 
consideration if it wishes to rescind the contract through 
the fraudulent inducement claim. Affirming a contract at 
some point in its history is not the equivalent of not seeking 
to rescind a contract in light of a fraudulent inducement 
claim. 
 
Alternatively, Allied claims that if parties are required to 
return consideration in order to bring fraudulent 
inducement claims, then it is entitled to an exception under 
Greenan v. Ernst, 393 Pa. 321, 143 A.2d 32 (1957). The 
Greenan Court allowed a party in an "insecure financial 
condition" to retain the consideration while maintaining a 
claim for fraudulent inducement. There is a considerable 
difference, the Greenan Court wrote, between "cases 
seeking to set aside a conveyance of real estate or the sale 
of a business and the present case in which plaintiff seeks 
an accounting which may find the defendant owing her 
additional funds." 393 Pa. at 321, 143 A.2d at 32. Greenan, 
therefore, provides a rare exception in an equitable 
proceeding where the refund of consideration was merely a 
matter of accounting. 
 
The District Court refused Allied's request for two 
reasons. First, Allied failed to demonstrate that it was in an 
"insecure financial condition." Second, the District Court 
considered the situation in Greenan , where returning 
consideration would prohibit the plaintif f from "maintaining 
herself and pursuing an action," to be distinct from Allied's 
predicament. We agree with the District court. Although 
Allied's arguments reasonably demonstrate that returning 
consideration would be difficult and perhaps imprudent, it 
would not leave Allied in the "insecurefinancial condition" 
required by Greenan. W e are bound by Pennsylvania law, 
and although returning consideration may cause Allied a 
substantial difficulty, it has not established that it would 
cause it to fall into an insecure financial condition. 
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In conclusion, the District Court properly granted USX's 
motion for summary judgment on Allied's fraudulent 
inducement claim. Thus, we need not reach USX's 
argument that Allied's fraudulent inducement claim is 
barred because the statements made by USX befor e 
formalizing the Settlement Agreement pertain to future 
promises. In the event Allied does retur n consideration and 
continues to press its fraudulent inducement claim, the 
District Court will address USX's contention. 
 
C. The Saxonburg Claim 
 
Section IV of the Settlement Agreement states, in part, 
"that the dismantling specification will not include the 
provision for . . . any environmental r emediation (including 
any remediation and/or removal of asbestos) by Allied, it 
being understood and agreed that any . . . environmental 
remediation shall be for USX's account . . . ." The terms 
governing the dismantling of the Saxonbur g Plant 
specifically provide that if "during the course of the 
demolition project an environmental condition is discovered 
that requires remediation, other than asbestos, . . . [then] 
the purchaser shall be responsible for any necessary 
remediation." 
 
Allied argues that any "handling" of the sinter dust 
should be considered a form of envir onmental remediation. 
Although USX paid Allied to load and haul the dust, Allied 
argues that it should be paid for the distinct service of 
vacuuming, cleaning, and otherwise removing the dust from 
the materials at the plant. Allied thus seeks to r ecover "the 
additional unanticipated costs it incurred in r emediating 
the Saxonburg facility of this sinter dust . .." Allied argues 
that the District Court improperly granted summary 
judgment against it on this claim because ther e is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Allied 
performed environmental remediation beyond the loading 
and hauling for which it was paid. We agr ee. 
 
As we have held, "the fundamental object in interpreting 
a contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties." 
Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc. , 71 F.3d 1125, 
1131 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Fineman v. Armstrong World 
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Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 215-216 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating 
that the task of the court "must be to interpr et the 
language of the settlement agreement in accor dance with 
the intention of the parties at the time of contracting"). If 
the parties' "intent can be cleanly extracted fr om the clear 
and unambiguous words that the parties have used, it is 
equally conventional wisdom that they are held to those 
words contained in the contract." Compass Tech., 71 F.3d 
1125. If, however, the meaning of contractual terms is not 
transparent, then the "clear waters become murkier." Id. 
 
If the contractual terms are facially ambiguous, then "the 
court should hear the evidence presented by both parties 
and then decide whether there are objective indicia that, 
from the linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms 
of the contract are susceptible of differ ent meanings." Id. 
(citations omitted). In making this determination, the court 
"must consider the words of the contract, the alternative 
meaning proffered by the challenging party, and the nature 
of the evidence that party could provide." Id. at 1132. "If the 
contract as a whole is susceptible to more than one 
reading, the fact finder resolves the matter," but if "it is 
unambiguous and can be interpreted only one way, the 
court interprets the contract as a matter of law." Pacitti v. 
Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir . 1999). 
 
Not surprisingly, the intended meanings of the ter ms 
"environmental remediation" and"loading and hauling" are 
entirely disputed by the parties. As we have held, 
"[s]ummary judgment may be granted based on the 
interpretation of a contract only if the contract is so clear 
that it can be read only one way." Battaglia v. McKendry, 
233 F.3d 720, 721 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). We 
must therefore determine if Allied's work with the dust, 
beyond and distinct from its loading and hauling, could 
reasonably be considered to be a for m of environmental 
remediation. 
 
The language of the contracting documents pr ovides little 
assistance in defining the terms "envir onmental 
remediation" or "loading and hauling." The contracts do not 
indicate what type of work will constitute envir onmental 
remediation, nor do they define what types of materials can 
be remedied. The relevant language simply states that "any 
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environmental remediation (including any r emediation 
and/or removal of asbestos)" will be paid by USX. The 
parenthetical clause provides a small clue into the intended 
meaning of the term remediation, since the statement that 
"remediation and/or removal of asbestos" will be paid by 
USX could reasonably be interpreted to distinguish between 
remediation and removal. This could r easonably be found 
to imply that remediation is not simply r emoval, but rather 
entails other work required to remedy the situation. 
Although this language provides only scant support for 
Allied's position, it is more convincing than USX's circular 
arguments that claim, for example, that "[s]ince Allied could 
not show that it performed any envir onmental remediation 
at Saxonburg, its remediation claim could not survive." By 
considering common and industry uses of these disputed 
terms, however, we can gain a mor e secure interpretive 
foothold. 
 
The first question is whether sinter dust is the type of 
material that could reasonably requir e environmental 
remediation. As Allied correctly asserts, sinter dust is 
considered a form of residual waste under the Pennsylvania 
Solid Waste Management Act. This tells us little, however, 
because the Act defines residual waste as"any garbage, 
refuse, or other discarded material or waste resulting from 
industrial operations . . . provided that it is not hazardous." 
35 P.S. S 6018.103. Under this definition, any harmless 
industrial byproduct could be considered r esidual waste, 
and surely all such benign materials do not r equire 
environmental remediation. 
 
Allied also makes the following argument: 1) asbestos is 
identified as requiring environmental r emediation in Section 
IV; 2) both asbestos and sinter dust are classified as 
residual waste under the Pennsylvania Solid W aste 
Management Act; 3) USX agreed to pay Allied to handle and 
remove asbestos; therefore 4) USX should pay Allied for all 
costs incurred as a result of handling and removing sinter 
dust. Such an argument commits fallacies of equivocation 
and undistributed middle.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The argument can be restated to demonstrate its fallacies: 
 
                                16 
  
Allied was not required to take any pr ecautions to control 
the sinter dust's movement in the environment, nor was it 
required to obtain any sort of per mit or authorization to 
execute the dismantling project. Allied did, however, 
institute safety precautions for its workers in accordance 
with OSHA regulations. Further, Allied was not permitted to 
backfill the dust on the Saxonburg site, which suggests 
that sinter dust merits special environmental consideration. 
Instead, the unleaded sinter dust was ultimately deposited 
in an approved and regulated landfill, and this 
distinguishes it from ordinary nontoxic waste. In light of 
these considerations, we believe that sinter dust could 
reasonably be considered a material that r equired 
environmental remediation. 
 
The second question is whether Allied's activities of 
cleaning the beams, equipment, and other materials of the 
sinter dust, as distinguished from loading and hauling, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       1. X belongs to category Z. 
 
       2. Y belongs to category Z. 
 
       2.a. X is the same as Y (implicit sub-conclusion) 
 
       3. A contracted the removal of X 
 
       4. A contracted the removal of Y 
 
Informally, such an argument presents an example of equivocation. 
From this we can distill the following syllogism: 
 
       1. All X are Z 
 
       2. All Y are Z 
 
       3. All Y are X 
 
This presents a formal fallacy of the undistributed middle, since Z, the 
middle term, is not distributed in either the minor or the major premise. 
The same error is committed in the following ar gument: 
 
       1. All women are humans 
 
       2. All men are humans 
 
       3. All women are men 
 
See generally RUGGERO ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS (1997). 
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could be considered environmental r emediation. According 
to the Pennsylvania Land Recycling and Envir onmental 
Remediation Act of 1995, actions undertaken to "clean-up, 
mitigate, correct, abate, minimize, eliminate, control or 
prevent a release of a regulated substance into the 
environment in order to protect the present or future public 
health, safety, welfare or the environment" are considered 
forms of environmental remediation. 35 P.S. S 6026.103. 
Allied's removal of sinter dust from the Saxonburg Plant's 
structures could reasonably be consider ed a necessary step 
in the process of "cleaning-up," "controlling," and 
"correcting" the problem. 
 
The question of whether the process of r emoving the dust 
from the raw materials constitutes a remedial activity 
distinct from the remedial activity of loading and hauling, 
however, is more difficult. Although r emoving the dust from 
the material facilitates the job of loading and hauling the 
dust, it is unclear that simply moving the dust fr om the 
beams or equipment on its way to be gathered for removal 
itself constitutes remedial work. By removing the dust from 
the equipment Allied could reasonably be considered to 
have performed an important service that prepared the 
dust to be properly disposed of. 
 
A reasonable distinction between "loading and hauling" 
the dust and cleaning and otherwise removing the dust 
from the structures in the plant can be supported by the 
common usage of the terms. If, by analogy, a friend asked 
you to help her "load and haul" her belongings from one 
apartment to another, you might reasonably presume that 
such a job entailed carrying boxes and furniture from the 
apartment to a truck. You might also r easonably presume 
that you were not expected to clean her belongings, 
organize them, and place them in boxes. It is not plainly 
evident that agreeing to load and haul materials necessarily 
entails a commitment to prepare them for transport. Two 
reasonable interpretations can be defended, and therefore 
the terms are ambiguous. Because Allied's handling of the 
dust in preparation for loading and hauling the dust may 
well be characterized as remedial work, ther e is a genuine 
issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. 
See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 
1001 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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Beyond the four corners of the contract and the plain 
meaning of the terms, the broader context of the 
agreements also does not give the phrases "environmental 
remediation" or "loading and hauling" definitive meanings. 
First, in divining both whether the parties may have 
intended "environmental remediation" to encompass the 
handling, vacuuming, and cleaning of the dust and whether 
USX's payment for Allied's loading and hauling the dust 
included handling and cleaning costs, we remain mindful of 
the circumstances under which this contract ar ose. Allied 
was awarded this contract to recover losses in accordance 
with the Settlement Agreement, and ther efore the project 
was intended to be a lucrative undertaking for Allied. To 
this end, the parties contracted for Allied to r eap all of the 
profits from the job and for USX to absorb all costs 
associated with environmental impediments. Any 
environmental conditions that detract fr om Allied's 
anticipated profits, therefore, can reasonably be considered 
to breach the general spirit of the contract. Allied's claim 
that it should not bear the cost of any envir onmental work 
is not without basis. 
 
Second, in the process of negotiating the ter ms under 
which Allied would load and haul the dust, Allied made 
clear in a letter to USX dated September 1, 1993, that its 
fee did not encompass cleaning: "This price does not 
include pre-cleaning of the building by hand or vacuum 
removal of dusts, if required AED can perform pre-cleaning 
on a T&M basis utilizing AED schedule of equipment r ental 
rates and manpower charging rates attached." USX 
accepted unit price but did not comment on the disclaimer. 
Although it did not reply to this clarification, USX was 
clearly on notice of Allied's intentions. Allied's 
understanding that environmental remediation was to be 
construed as a broad term was also articulated in an 
affidavit by its President, John Ramun: 
 
       In connection with the negotiation of the Settlement 
       Agreement and in particular what later became Section 
       IV(B)(2), I advised USX that in order to ensur e the 
       profitability of the proposed pr ojects (including 
       Saxonburg) Allied was agreeing to per form, USX's 
       obligation with regard to `envir onmental remediation' 
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       covered any material that required special testing, 
       handling, treatment, storage, or disposal. Allied 
       intended to use mass demolition techniques in its`one 
       step' process to dismantle the buildings and facilities, 
       process the scrap and grade the remainingfill material. 
       Any material requiring special testing, handling, 
       treatment, storage or disposal would adversely impact 
       our ability to efficiently generate this scrap. 
 
"Summary judgment may be granted based on the 
interpretation of a contract only if the contract is so clear 
that it can be read only one way." Battaglia, 233 F.3d at 
721. The meaning of the terms central to Allied's 
Saxonburg claim present a genuine issue of material fact, 
and therefore we must reverse on this issue. 
 
D. Delay Damages 
 
Allied's delay damages are precluded by Section 21.1 of 
the Saxonburg Contract, which provides: 
 
       If during the course of the demolition project an 
       environmental condition is discovered that requires 
       remediation, other than asbestos, the contractor shall 
       notify the purchaser and the purchaser shall be 
       responsible for any necessary remediation. The 
       contractor shall not be entitled to any additional 
       compensation resulting from any delays due to the 
       remediation process. 
 
If it is determined that the work beyond loading and 
hauling the dust does indeed constitute envir onmental 
remediation, then USX must pay appropriate damages. 
Such payment would effectively fulfill its r esponsibility for 
such remediation, and any damages beyond thatfinding 
are barred by the plain language of Section 21.1. 
 
E. USX's Counterclaims 
 
Because we are reversing the District Court's conclusion 
that Section V of the Settlement Agreement is 
unenforceable, we will reinstate only USX's counterclaims 
that were dismissed as a direct result of the District Court's 
enforceability ruling. In light of our holding that Section V 
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is not void as against public policy, the District Court must 
now address USX's counterclaim that Allied breached 





In conclusion, we will reverse and remand the Section V 
and Saxonburg issues to the District Court, affirm the 
District Court's order granting summary judgment on the 
fraudulent inducement claim, and reinstate USX's relevant 
counterclaims. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                21 
